C orporate governance research indicates that large owners provide effective monitoring. In this article, we expand firm-level notions of monitoring to include large institutional owners' investment portfolios and suggest that portfolio characteristics affect owners' motivation and capacity to monitor, which compromises the positive effects of monitoring at the firm level. Specifically, using data from 533 large firms over a 10-year period, we find that increases in the size of portfolio holdings, number of portfolio blockholdings, portfolio turnover, and the importance of a particular holding reduce monitoring effectiveness in the context of executive compensation. Overall, we provide preliminary evidence that the portfolio characteristics of the largest institutional owners contradict firm-level monitoring effects; therefore, we strongly recommend that future studies consider both firm-and portfolio-level effects simultaneously to understand monitoring effectiveness.
plications of dispersed owners and self-interested managers using the separation of ownership and control thesis, monitoring by large owners has been considered an important governance solution to agency problems (Shleifer and Vishny 1997) . Large owners are more likely to assume monitoring costs than free-riding small investors, particularly when the benefits of monitoring outweigh the costs of monitoring and allow large owners to recoup their investments (Gillan and Starks 2000, Shleifer and Vishny 1986) . Research has examined the benefits of large-owner monitoring at the firm level across several contexts including firm valuation (Thomsen and Pedersen 2000) , productivity (Hill and Snell 1989) , corporate strategy (Amihud and Lev 1981) , and executive compensation (Hartzell and Starks 2003) . In fact, Demsetz (1986) suggests that monitoring by large owners is more "robust and continuous" than is the disciplining effect of the market for corporate control.
Prior research conceptualizes large-owner monitoring at the firm level in two ways. First, the "ownership concentration" perspective considers the ownership stakes of the largest owner, the largest five owners, owners with 1% of equity, and/or owners with 0.2% or more of the firm's equity (Pedersen and Thomsen 2003 , Hartzell and Starks 2003 , Tihanyi et al. 2003 , Pollock et al. 2002 .
For example, Hartzell and Starks (2003) find an association between the ownership of the top five institutional owners and both reduced total executive compensation and increased pay for performance sensitivity, in support of the effectiveness of firm-level monitoring. Second, the "blockholder" perspective suggests that owners must have at least a 5% stake (typically dummy coded) to be effective monitors who can influence compensation (Agrawal and Mandelker 1990 , Core et al. 1999 , Mehran 1995 . Along these lines, Beatty and Zajac suggest that blockholders, considered better monitors than small holders, are associated with a "lower proportion of total managerial compensation derived from non-cash incentives" (1994, p. 328) . In summary, research on monitoring by large owners either explicitly or implicitly considers the implications of ownership stakes at the firm level without acknowledging owners' needs or capabilities to monitor the many firms within their portfolios.
Over time, institutional ownership has largely supplanted individual and family ownership and accounts for the majority of all ownership (Daily et al. 2003, Healy and Palepu 2003) . Reiterating this trend, Hoskisson and colleagues (2002, p. 698) state: "Ownership concentration has been identified as an important tool to curtail a manager's propensity to pursue inefficient strategies In particular, institutional investors have emerged as major equity owners and thus key players in corporate governance." Despite this cognizance, research associates monitoring effectiveness with large institutional ownership stakes at the firm level and ignores the implications of owners' large portfolios. That is, large institutional owners tend to be equated with family or other large individual blockholders, who often maintain a long-term, concentrated presence in few firms and whose fortune is closely linked to their monitoring of those firms (Anderson and Reeb 2003) . As early as 1976, Drucker noted that institutional investors are not typical "owners"; instead, they are investors who hold well diversified portfolios with stock in thousands of companies simultaneously. A decade later, Demsetz (1986) suggested that institutional owners do not specialize their portfolios the way that individual and family owners do, casting doubt on their motivation to effectively monitor firms. Hendry and colleagues (2006) recently reiterated this point by suggesting that both institutional investors and executives view institutional investors as traders, whose main interest is to maximize portfolio profits while maintaining portfolio liquidity, rather than as owners who attempt to improve corporate governance.
Although theoretical research recognizes the importance of both firm and portfolio implications of institutional ownership on the need and capability to monitor (Ryan and Schneider 2002) , no empirical research that we are aware of examines this issue. For example, consider the portfolio characteristics of three well known mutual funds, Wellington Management, Fidelity Management (refer to Table 1), and Vanguard. In 2000, Wellington Management was the largest institutional owner in Penford Corp. (9.85%), but the average firm holding of Wellington Management ($81 million) was approximately eight times more important than their $9.8 million firm-level stake in Penford. Similarly, in 2001, Fidelity was the largest owner in Tidewater Inc. (9.07%) but also had more than 2,500 firms in its portfolio, of which 421 investments were greater than the one in Tidewater. Finally, in the year 2000, Vanguard had 43 unique investments with a value greater than $1 billion and 296 other investments above $100 million within its portfolio. It is unlikely that these investors exert the same time and effort in monitoring all of their investments.
This article develops the monitoring construct further by expanding the notion of monitoring to include institutional owners' portfolio characteristics. For example, if the largest institutional owner's portfolio consists of many large holdings and/or blockholdings, these holdings may demand the monitoring attention of owners and detract from monitoring effectiveness at the firm level. Alternatively, if institutional owners have higher preferences for portfolio liquidity (i.e., portfolio turnover), their monitoring effectiveness should decrease because they face declining incentives to monitor because of their propensity to use exit. Finally, if large institutional owners pay more attention to their larger holdings, they may compromise their monitoring of smaller holdings. Hence, our research question is as follows:
How do large institutional owners' firm-level ownership and their portfolio characteristics influence monitoring effectiveness?
We might answer this question by considering a range of organizational issues (e.g., valuation, productivity, corporate strategy, research and development, corporate restructuring, etc.), but instead we focus on executive compensation, which clearly represents an area of active interest on the part of the institutional investors. These owners have become more vocal about the forms and levels of executive compensation during the past two decades through shareholder resolutions, proxy voting, and compensation guidelines advocacy (Karpoff et al. 1996) .
1 Both anecdotal evidence and empirical research find that large institutional owners have taken the lead in mitigating agency conflicts with regard to executive compensation (Bebchuk and Fried 2004) . Despite the evidence related to the monitoring effectiveness of large owners in particular and institutional owners in general, many researchers find that agency predictions regarding executive compensation do not hold true or that compensation and performance relate only weakly (Bebchuk and Fried 2004 , Jensen and Murphy 2004 , Yermack 1995 . To understand this complex phenomenon, we believe that we must account for the portfolio characteristics of large owners. Specifically, whereas existing research focuses on the ownership benefits at the firm level (which are fairly obvious and well documented), it ignores that institutional owners possess stakes in hundreds and even thousands of firms and thus may face limited incentives to monitor. By assessing an owner's portfolio characteristics, we may be able to shed more light on the ownership-executive compensation relationship.
Research Contributions
Our research question is important from both theoretical and practical perspectives. From a theoretical standpoint, we expand current notions of monitoring effectiveness by considering not only firm-but also portfolio-level facets, in line with the recommendations of Ryan and Schneider (2002) and Dalton and colleagues' (2003) suggestion that we still know little about the implications of an institutional owner's portfolio in terms of mitigating agency problems, despite the increasingly dominant role of institutional investors. Our framework differentiates the monitoring effectiveness of large investors on the basis of their ability to monitor a focal firm and their incentives to monitor, as reflected by their portfolio structure. Thus, from a theoretical perspective, we suggest that monitoring effectiveness depends on both firm-and portfolio-level variables and focus on ignored aspects of ownership, namely, what else an institutional owner owns in terms of its portfolio holdings.
For practice, the portfolio implications of monitoring are important not only from the point of view of individual firms, financial intermediaries, investors, and regulators but also with regard to the general demand for stronger corporate governance. If portfolio characteristics offset firm-level monitoring effectiveness, large institutional investors should consider how to develop the necessary monitoring capacity in their portfolios or develop market intermediaries to provide them with such services. Current securities laws generally discourage large ownership positions, as well as coordination among "voting groups" of owners (Coffee 1991) , which may have encouraged the fragmentation of owners' portfolios and reduced their "voice" related to monitoring. Because the number of stocks required for suitable diversification is much lower than that observed in many institutional owners' portfolios (Pozen 2002) , it makes sense for interested parties to pay attention to tradeoffs between diversification and monitoring.
Hypotheses Large Owners and Monitoring at the Firm Level
We begin by revisiting the conventional logic supporting the effects of large owners at the firm level. Large owners can monitor agents effectively and reduce agency costs because of their higher stakes and relatively lower coordination costs compared with more dispersed owners whose monitoring costs are prohibitively expensive (Shleifer and Vishny 1986) . Large owners can bear the costs of monitoring compared to small owners, because their potential returns from monitoring can exceed the costs (Gillan and Starks 2000) . In the words of Conyon and Peck (1998, p. 150 ) who paraphrase Hambrick and Finkelstein (1995) , "widely dispersed shareholders may have little incentive to monitor management and shareholders may not optimally exercise their corporate control responsibilities The presence of a large shareholder may result in improved monitoring, vigilance, and corporate governance." Large owners may have to use "voice" and monitor management because they lack the ability to divest themselves of their investments en masse because the sale of large blocks of equity could lead to a substantial drop in the stock price (Coffee 1991 , Pozen 2002 . Finally, large owners can exploit the power they gain from their ownership stakes to monitor effectively (Kochhar and David 1996) . In summary, both theory and empirics suggest that large owners are effective monitors (Shleifer and Vishny 1997) .
Large Institutional Ownership and Executive Compensation
There are two approaches that consider the effects of large owners (including blockholders) on executive compensation. The first approach views large owners as effective monitors who can act as a check on pay levels and ensure that management does not expropriate rents from shareholders in the form of greater compensation. This approach assumes that large owners can ensure ex ante that gains in CEO wealth from incentive compensation will be linked to shareholder value creation. These studies link large-owner monitoring to (1) the level of compensation (e.g., Core et al. 1999 , David et al. 1998 , Hartzell and Starks 2003 and (2) pay for performance sensitivity (e.g., Starks 2003, Yermack 1995) . The second approach views large-owner monitoring and the use of incentive alignment as substitutes (Rediker and Seth 1995) . In this approach, the lower use of incentive alignment necessitates monitoring (Beatty and or the presence of large owners reduces the need for high proportions of incentive compensation (Mehran 1995 , David et al. 1998 ). These studies have demonstrated links between large owners (or blockholders) and the mix of compensation (e.g., Bloom and Milkovich 1998 , Beatty and Zajac 1994 , Mehran 1995 .
In introducing our first hypothesis, we recap existing theory and empirical research in the context of large institutional ownership. We expect that large institutional owners will be associated with lower levels of compensation and higher levels of pay for performance sensitivity (Hartzell and Starks 2003) . Previous research suggests that the presence of large owners is negatively related to pay levels but has not focused explicitly on institutional ownership (Dyl 1988, Hambrick and Finkelstein 1995) . Extending this logic, Hartzell and Starks (2003) find that large institutional owners are associated with reduced levels of total compensation, consistent with the findings of large ownership in general. In addition, we consider another important aspect of executive compensation: the sensitivity of pay to shareholder wealth creation (Hambrick and Finkelstein 1995 , Hartzell and Starks 2003 , Jensen and Murphy 1990 , Yermack 1995 . Hambrick and Finkelstein (1995) find that externally controlled firms with large owners have greater pay sensitivity. More recently, Hartzell and Starks (2003) indicated that large institutional owners, as more effective monitors, encourage greater pay for performance sensitivity such that CEOs receive greater rewards for improving shareholder value. Because stock options represent the greatest portion of incentive compensation, we argue that large owners will prefer tighter relationships between stock option pay and shareholder wealth creation. Hence, the literature suggests that monitoring resulting from large institutional ownership is associated with fewer agency conflicts, leading to less total executive compensation and increased pay for performance sensitivity.
The second approach (i.e., the substitution perspective) suggests that monitoring and incentive alignment are intricately linked and that this has implications for pay mix (Roth and O'Donnell 1996) . Under optimal contracting, executives will receive more incentives until the incremental cost of these incentives exceeds the benefits derived from them (Bebchuk et al. 2002) . However, in the presence of monitoring by large owners, this threshold will be reached earlier than in the absence of monitoring by large owners. Holmstrom (1979) argues that even imperfect information gained from monitoring can benefit principals and decrease their losses. If large owners can effectively monitor agents, they can reduce their reliance on incentives even with imperfect information. Because incentive compensation generally is more costly because it has to compensate executives for added risk, monitoring by large owners should be adversely related to the use of incentive compensation as part of the pay mix.
2 Zajac and Westphal (1994) , using the substitution argument, state: "firms facing a more severe incentive problem (due to CEOs having lower incentives from their compensation contracts and equity holdings) are more likely to have governance structures that provide a higher level of monitoring of managerial behavior." Other studies find that large owners are associated with a lower use of incentives as a proportion of total compensation (David et al. 1998 , Mehran 1995 . These findings are consistent with Eisenhardt's (1989) assertion that principals capable of monitoring management prefer to use more behavioral-based compensation (e.g., greater proportion of salary in the pay mix) and less outcomes-based compensation (e.g., lower proportion of stock options and other allied incentives). Applying these arguments, monitoring resulting from large institutional ownership will be associated with greater use of behavioral-based compensation (e.g., greater proportion of salary in the pay mix) and less outcomes-based compensation (e.g., lower proportions of incentives in the pay mix). Large Institutional Ownership and Portfolio Considerations Little research investigates how institutional owners' portfolios may enable, or compromise, monitoring at the firm level. Researchers implicitly assume that large institutional owners can develop organizational structures and capabilities to handle the complexity of managing their diverse portfolios. First, in terms of organizational structures, as the number of companies in an owner's portfolio increases, the institutional owner could recruit more fund managers and provide them with attractive incentives to ensure the effective management of each fund. Second, in terms of organizational capabilities, large institutional investors could increase their monitoring expertise beyond that of the average investor by employing professional portfolio managers and providing them with resources and incentives to effectively manage investments Mandelker 1992, Almazan et al. 2005) . Large institutional investors with better investment performance should be more skillful monitors. In conclusion, large institutional owners may possess economies of scale related to monitoring because of their organizational structures and better capabilities as reflected in their portfolio performance compared with small individual investors (cf., Ryan and Schneider 2002) .
However, the average institutional owner in our study maintains approximately 2,000 firms within its portfolio of investments. From a theoretical perspective, the organizational structures and capabilities of these investors lead to an intriguing question: Are large institutional owners able to supply adequate monitoring considering the demands made by such a multiplicity of investments?
In answering this question, we suggest that three factors influence these demands from a portfolio perspective: (1) the size of portfolio investments and block investments, (2) the propensity of the institutional investor to exit, and (3) the importance of a particular holding within the investor's portfolio.
Portfolio Holdings and Monitoring Effectiveness
The tendency has been to liken large institutional owners to family or other large individual blockholders who maintain a longer-term concentrated presence in only a few firms (Anderson and Reeb 2003) . However, the multitude of investments in their portfolios may compromise large institutional owners' monitoring at the firm level, in that they may not be able to provide the same intensity of monitoring to each investment provided by less diversified individual or family investors. Both anecdotal and empirical evidence indicates that institutional owners invest in the truest sense and do not always act as "owners" (Demsetz 1986 , Coffee 1991 , Hendry et al. 2006 . For example, Coffee (1991 Coffee ( , p. 1291 points out "indexed investors, who may hold securities in a thousand or more corporations, have largely abandoned 'exit,' but also find the exercise of 'voice' infeasible because their extensive holdings exceed their capacity to monitor." Hendry and colleagues (2006, p. 1111) demonstrate this investor orientation of large institutional owners in their interviews with company managers and their institutional investors, as the following summary of comments of a fund manager of a large British institutional investor attests:
Even where the investor was a dominant shareholder it was a trading model that was critical, "We had 10% of the company and when you got there, you just have to know the company a hell of a lot better. I don't think we would be interested in meeting the company to try to and work out whether we thought the managing director's any good. What we are really trying to do is, we want to be absolutely sure about what we worked out from our numbers was effective, correct." This interviewee went on to talk of due diligence but this was not the due diligence of an owner. It was the due diligence of an investor who had made a big bet with clients' money to make sure the information underlying that bet was accurate [emphasis added]. For other investors working out whether the management was any good was precisely what they were interested in, but only because, in their cases, that was an important component of their trading models.
Given this investor orientation, several factors might reduce monitoring effectiveness because of competing priorities in the portfolio, as well as restricted monitoring resources: (1) goal incongruence within the portfolio among different types of funds, (2) cost considerations of different types of funds, (3) lack of incentives to fund managers to monitor, (4) legal ramifications that may restrict monitoring, and (5) an extensive focus on problem firms within the portfolio. In other words, certain portfolio characteristics may demand more monitoring by large institutional owners, but the monitoring supply may be inadequate.
As far as competing priorities are concerned, portfolios consist of funds with varying objectives. Morningstar, an independent firm, categorizes funds by three possible levels of capitalization (large, mid, and small) and three investment objectives (value, blend, and growth), which yields nine possible combinations (Pozen 2002) . Different fund objectives within the portfolio can conflict, leading to inefficient uses of monitoring resources, whereas less diversified blockholders should have less conflict and more homogenous monitoring.
Second, fund fees and fund staffing may not cover the costs of monitoring. The fee structure of some funds guarantees little monitoring; for example, the advisory fees of index mutual funds are approximately 20 basis points (0.20%) per year, whereas fees for venture capital funds are around 1%-2% plus 10%-20% of all profits (Pozen 2002, p. 513) . High fund fees prompt more active monitoring whereas low fund fees require fund managers to bear the cost of monitoring. These cost implications also occur in pension funds that often "have only a skeleton in-house staff, which then hires several external money managers, and the function of the in-house staff is basically to evaluate the performance of these fund managers" (Coffee 1991 (Coffee , p. 1342 . Even institutional activism literature emphasizes cost considerations-the annual activism program budget for the top five pension funds ranges from $50,000 to $1 million, amounting to less than 0.005% of fund assets (Del Guercio and Hawkins 1999, p. 328) .
A third factor contributing to the dissipation of effort at the portfolio level is the general lack of incentives to fund managers to improve their monitoring efforts. Coffee (1991 Coffee ( , p. 1326 states that investment managers are often compensated on the basis of an annual fee "equal to a declining percentage of the fund it manages" such as one-third of 1% of the first $500 million, one quarter of 1% of the next $250 million, and so forth. Such schemes (often used by mutual funds and pension funds) may provide insufficient incentives to encourage monitoring. Woidtke (2002, p. 103) finds that private and public pension fund managers fare worse; in 1993 the average private pension fund manager who managed a fund of at least $1 billion in assets received base pay of $101,700, only 60% of these funds paid bonuses, and the average bonus paid was $25,600. The figures for public pension fund managers indicate a $75,200 base salary for funds over $1 billion, a paltry 7% of these funds paid bonuses, and an average bonus paid of $8,400. Unless there is clear link between monitoring and immediate improvements in fund performance, fund managers may hesitate to spend time on monitoring activities because incentive systems fail to encourage them to do so. Fourth, the specific legal and regulatory environments of institutional owners may limit monitoring and activism further. Private pension funds are constrained in their exercise of control over firms in their portfolio under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act; attempts to influence management could lose plans their tax-exempt status (Ryan and Schneider 2002) . Similarly, insurance firms who play dual roles of equity holder and bondholder may compromise monitoring because such activity would affect their claims as bondholders (Ryan and Schneider 2002) . Finally, institutional activism literature indicates that institutional owners are active in some companies in their portfolios. The choice to be active or to monitor actively may relate to poor performers in the portfolio or could be symbolic in nature (Carleton et al. 1998 , Wahal 1996 . Excessive focus on high-profile poor performers may distract attention from the rest of the portfolio.
These arguments suggest that monitoring supply may be limited, in comparison with monitoring demands. Thus, portfolio characteristics may compromise monitoring at the firm level for several reasons. Large institutional owners may be less effective monitors when the average holdings in their portfolios become larger due to the sheer size of the total investment portfolio or more blockholdings. As the average stake increases, the demand for monitoring these large investments increases and therefore limits monitoring effectiveness based on the ownership at the firm level. Returning to the case of Penford Corp., Wellington Management's stake of 9.85% (i.e., $9.8 million), though large at the firm level, is minor compared with the average holding in Wellington's portfolio ($81 million), thereby diminishing the incentives of the institutional owner to monitor. Similar arguments exist regarding the large blocks held in the institutional owner's portfolio. Because these large owners are most likely to benefit from monitoring and are unlikely to resort to free-riding, they will have to monitor a larger number of blocks in their portfolio, which will again stretch monitoring. As an illustration, consider an institutional investor holding 50% of its portfolio in blocks of 5% compared with another institutional investor that holds 10% of its portfolio in blocks of 5%. These investors have different monitoring demands. Assuming that greater blockholdings require more monitoring, the benefits of firm-level monitoring get compromised as other portfolio firms vie for monitoring attention. Thus, based on our arguments regarding the supply and demand for monitoring, the portfolio characteristics of large institutional owners will detract from their monitoring effectiveness as large owners and at the same time will offset the benefits of monitoring from the substitution perspective. Thus far, our arguments about the implications of portfolio characteristics have been predicated on the assumption that institutional owners want to monitor the larger investments in their portfolios but that their concentrated portfolios, containing many large holdings vying for monitoring attention, take a toll on their monitoring effectiveness. However, there is another choice available to these investors. As Hirschman (1970) elegantly states in his book Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, exit provides a viable alternative for many institutional investors. Eakins et al. (1998) suggest that institutional investors prefer firms with greater stock turnovers, which implies that exit (i.e., portfolio liquidity) becomes an important characteristic that investors seek in choosing their portfolio firms. Institutional owners such as mutual funds, banks, and insurance companies often need greater liquidity, because their shareholder depositors or policyholders can leave at a moment's notice. In the early 1990s, the turnover rates for 73% of institutional investors over the course of a year ranged from 26% to 200% (Coffee 1991 (Coffee , p. 1340 . Although this rate has declined in recent years, the decline is attributable more to the emergence of index funds with their emphasis on lower fee structures than to investors' decisions to take on additional monitoring responsibilities (Coffee 1991 (Coffee , p. 1340 .
Higher levels of portfolio turnover also indicate institutional owners' lower preferences for monitoring. Monitoring is expensive, requires a good deal of effort, has uncertain outcomes, and provides decreasing marginal returns (Tosi and Gomez-Mejia 1994) . A comprehensive research summary of the monitoring benefits associated with ownership activism suggests that such monitoring creates few meaningful differences at the firm level in terms of profitability or even shareholder value creation (Karpoff 2001) . Given the uncertain short-term benefits of monitoring, institutional investors with high portfolio turnovers may be reluctant to invest in monitoring capacity at the portfolio level. Using exit strategies when dealing with some companies in their portfolio does not necessarily mean that the institutional owner will not use voice for other firms, but it does mean that their monitoring capacity is compromised by the tradeoffs they make with respect to portfolio turnover. On one hand, a large institutional owner (i.e., with a firm-level stake of 6%) with an annual portfolio turnover of 6% is more likely to invest in monitoring because it should benefit from its monitoring investment. On the other hand, an investor with the same firm-level stake that has an annual portfolio turnover of 60% is less sure about its continuity in the firm and is less likely to benefit from the spillover of its monitoring capabilities developed from monitor-ing other firms in its portfolio. Therefore, it is likely that investors with high portfolio turnover will not put in resources to develop monitoring capabilities at the portfolio level and thus compromise monitoring benefits at the firm level and offset the benefits of monitoring from the substitution perspective.
Hypothesis 3. Institutional ownership turnover at the portfolio level associates negatively with monitoring effectiveness; specifically, the portfolio turnover of the largest owner relates positively to the level of total compensation, negatively to pay for performance sensitivity, negatively to the salary proportion of the pay mix, and positively to the contingent proportion of the pay mix, ceteris paribus.
We also turn our attention to the implications of the significance of the focal firm within the largest institutional investor's portfolio. Some portfolio structures may be consistent with large ownership monitoring at the firm level, because the premise of large-owner monitoring depends on the benefits that accrue to the largest monitor. Such benefits also arise when large institutional owners pay more attention to larger firms in their portfolios. Therefore, portfolio-and firm-level interests should coincide when institutional owners have both the "means and the incentive to take action [i.e., they own a substantial share of the target firm's stock] in that a significant portion of their portfolio is invested in the firm" (Ryan and Schneider 2002, p. 561 , see also Roe 1994, Sundaramurthy and Lyon 1998) .
As mentioned in the development of Hypothesis 1, large investors tend to monitor effectively because the benefits of their monitoring outweigh the costs. Theory also suggests that large institutional investors should focus more on larger firms in their portfolio because doing so results in more obvious performance improvements. At the same time, even the largest institutional owner may look askance at the firms in the lower rung of their portfolio holdings, even if, at the firm level, they hold a significant stake. Although owners might face pressures to monitor their smaller holdings, the net benefits of successful monitoring combined with the limited incentives to do so (explicated in Hypothesis 2) suggest that monitoring will be compromised for lowranking investments. Previous research clearly identifies this conundrum. For example, Ryan and Schneider (2002) theorize that institutional owners are more likely to be active in target firms as the percentage of their portfolio invested in the focal firm's stock increases. Alternatively, even if institutional owners own large stakes in firms, if those firms form an insignificant part of their portfolio, they are unlikely to be interested in monitoring. By concentrating their efforts on larger holdings, these institutional owners are most likely to benefit their primary investors. Therefore, we posit that large institutional owners focus their monitoring efforts on the larger holdings in their portfolios, at the expense of smaller holdings, based on the rational calculus of effort expended to benefits accrued. Thus, when the firm is important in the large institutional owner's portfolio, we expect this portfolio characteristic to improve monitoring effectiveness of these large owners and at the same time complement the benefits of monitoring from the substitution perspective. Whereas the main contribution of our paper has been to augment the monitoring construct by considering the portfolio characteristics of large institutional owners, our final hypothesis explores interaction effects between the large institutional owner's firm-level ownership and its portfolio characteristics in terms of overall monitoring effectiveness. We might expect that as (1) the number of blocks held by a large owner, (2) the portfolio turnover of the large owner, or (3) the significance of the firm in the portfolio increases, firm-level monitoring implications vary as well. For example, if the large institutional owner holds no other blocks in any other firms within its portfolio, any decrease in monitoring effectiveness at the firm level should be minimal. Alternatively, if the large institutional owner holds numerous other blocks, monitoring effectiveness will be compromised. Similarly, if the large institutional owner has low portfolio turnover, indicating that it seldom uses exit, the decrease in monitoring effectiveness at the firm level should be minimal. However, a high level of portfolio turnover suggests a decrease in monitoring effectiveness. Finally, large institutional owners likely will be more vigilant monitors of the larger, more significant firms in their portfolios, so firm-level concentration and portfolio significance will interact in a positive manner. Missing variables from the different data sets brought our sample to 4,520 firm-year observations for 533 firms. To ensure that our independent variables predate the dependent variables, we lagged them one year. The sample represents 241 industries at the four-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) level and 50 industries at the two-digit SIC level. Because we imposed no restrictions during the data extraction, the sample represents a good cross section of industries; furthermore, the 10-year time period for the study is important because it encompasses a variety of economic conditions. Unlike prior research, which considers the level of ownership in the focal firm (e.g., Mandelker 1990, Hartzell and , we consider the entire portfolio of the institutional investor and its behavior over time to estimate its incentives and ability to monitor at the firm level.
Dependent Variables
Total Compensation. This variable represents the value of all components of the CEO's compensation for a specific year, including salary, bonuses, long-term incentives, and the value of options granted in that year.
Proportion of Salary.
To measure the salary portion of the CEO's compensation that is not directly linked to organizational outcomes, we use the ratio of the CEO's base salary to the total compensation he or she earned for the year.
Proportion of Contingent Compensation. Whereas options-based compensation is linked to long-term outcomes, annual bonuses could be tied to various short-term performance measures, such as accounting earnings (Healy 1985) . Furthermore, contingent compensation such as bonuses and long-term incentives exposes managers to more risk and income instability (Daily et al. 1998, Tosi and Gomez-Mejia 1994) . Therefore, we measure the proportion of compensation that is contingent on firm-level outcomes both in the short term and in the long term. This variable represents the ratio of options and bonus to the total compensation the CEO earned during the year.
Pay for Performance Sensitivity. Although influential institutional owners can restrain excessive executive compensation, they may be more concerned about pay for performance (e.g. Murphy 1990, Hambrick and Finkelstein 1995) . Therefore, we measure the pay for performance sensitivity as the sensitivity of the options grant per $1,000 change in shareholder wealth. Following Yermack (1995), we calculate this variable using the partial derivative of the Black-Scholes value of options grants. Stock options represent the largest component of executive compensation, and institutional owners have expressed increased interest in this form of compensation (Hartzell and Starks 2003) . We note that this variable provides an ex ante measure of performance sensitivity in contrast to ex post measures, such as changes in CEO pay. Thus,
Pay for Performance Sensitivity

≈
shares represented by option award shares outstanding at start of year
For example, a sensitivity value of 1.13 indicates that the value of stock option compensation increased by $1.13 per $1,000 increase in shareholder value.
Independent Variables
Largest Institutional Owner Stake. Following Thomsen and Pedersen (2000), we measure this variable as the percentage of shares owned by the largest institutional owner (top institutional owner's shares divided by firm's total number of outstanding shares) in the focal firm, using data from the CDA/Spectrum Thomson Financial 13F database. As the percentage of shares owned increases, owners can exercise more influence over the firm and monitor more effectively. However, this measure fails to account for owners' incentives to monitor from the portfolio perspective or the importance of the focal firm to the institutional investor.
Portfolio-Level Measures. Portfolio-based measures of ownership address incentives to monitor, as embedded in the portfolio-holding characteristics of the largest institutional investor, and contribute additional information to more traditional measures of monitoring effectiveness (Bushee 1998) . To calculate the portfolio measures, we first identified the largest institutional owner using Thomson Financial's 13F database for each year in the study. In the second step, we extracted the complete portfolio holdings for these institutional owners to calculate the portfolio-based ownership variables. We provide numerical examples of portfolio measures for Wellington Management Company, Fidelity Management & Research Co., and Newsouth Capital Management, Inc. in Table 1 .
Portfolio Concentration. Following Bushee (1998) we measure this variable as the average value of the investments in the institutional owner's portfolio. Thus, it measures the tendency of the top institutional investor to hold large stakes in its portfolio. If the largest institutional owner holds significant investments in many other firms, its monitoring efforts at the focal firm may be compromised because it has become too busy to monitor effectively. The following calculation (Bushee 1998) pertains to a skewed and kurtotic variable, so we took a natural log transformation:
where concentration is the sum of portfolio weights (shares held times stock price) in firm k at the end of the year divided by the total number of stocks owned by the institution (Bushee 1998) .
Portfolio Blockholding. This variable measures the tendency of the top institutional blockholder to invest in large blocks. Traditional agency literature posits that blockholders that own 5% or more of the company's stock have sufficient incentives and ability to monitor effectively (Bethel et al. 1998) . Therefore, this variable provides a more conservative measure of the propensity of the largest institutional investor to monitor firms in its portfolio other than the focal firm. We use a modified version of Bushee's (1998) measure of the proportion of the actual blockholdings in the portfolio. Because we are interested in the competing effect of investments vying for monitoring attention, we multiply Bushee's measure by 1 if the institutional owner is a blockholder in the focal firm and 0 otherwise. where Block kt = 1 if the percentage holding in firm k in the portfolio is greater than or equal to 5% and 0 otherwise, and Target t = 1 if the percentage holding in the focal firm is greater than or equal to 5% and 0 otherwise.
Portfolio Blockownership
Portfolio Turnover. This variable measures the trading behavior of the largest institutional investor. Investors with high portfolio turnover could be less prone to hold stocks over longer time periods and thus less likely to engage in costly monitoring efforts. Following Bushee (1998) this measure is the average absolute change in an institution's ownership position over a quarter (denoted by q). Because increased turnover may be fueled by the fund's growth and availability, we scale the shares traded by the fund's equity holdings at both the beginning and the end of the quarter. The following calculation is based on Thomson Financial 13F data; we take a natural log transformation to correct for skewness Portfolio Firm Significance. This variable reflects the percentile ranking of the focal firm in the portfolio of its largest owner, based on the dollar value of the investments. The measure is inversed, so a higher number indicates that the focal firm is of greater importance to the institutional owner; for example, the 99th percentile means that the investment in the focal firm exceeds in value 99% of the other investments in the portfolio. Thus, the variable indicates the proportion of the institutional investor's portfolio that consists of lower investment stakes than those in the focal firm. The following calculation is based on Thomson Financial 13F data: 
Control Variables
To isolate the effects of the ownership variables on CEO compensation, we control for several factors that have been shown to influence compensation in previous studies.
Size. Previous studies link firm size and CEO compensation (Gomez-Mejia 1994, Lambert et al. 1991) . We control for firm size by using the natural logarithm of the firm's total assets.
Growth. Prior research argues that CEOs in highgrowth firms may be higher marginal contributors and thus receive greater compensation (Finkelstein and Boyd 1998 , Gaver and Gaver 1993 , Wright et al. 1996 . Therefore, we control for growth opportunities with the Tobin's Q proxy of market value to the book value of equity. Firm Performance. We used both accounting-and market-based measures of performance. Following David and colleagues (1998), we include return on assets (ROA) and Jensen's alpha as measures of market-based performance.
CEO Ownership. The level of ownership by CEOs has been the subject of many studies that relate it to risk taking, firm strategy, and CEO compensation (Berger et al. 1997, Finklestein and Hambrick 1989) . In agency theory, CEO ownership serves as an indicator of incentive alignment and thus affects the potential for opportunistic behavior, such as compensation maximization (Finkelstein and Boyd 1998) . We measure CEO equity as the percentage of outstanding shares owned by the CEO at the end of each fiscal year.
Change in CEO.
Changes in CEO appointments may influence firm strategy and CEO compensation (Berger et al. 1997, Finklestein and Hambrick 1989) . We measure this variable with a dummy code equal to 1 if the firm experienced executive succession during the year.
CEO Duality. Executives serving simultaneously as chair of the board of directors may be better able to influence their compensation (David et al. 1998, Westphal and . Therefore, we included an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chair and 0 otherwise. CEO Tenure. Suggested by prior literature as a proxy for entrenchment and ability of the CEOs to exercise power in setting their own compensation packages (Hill and Phan 1991) , CEO tenure appears in this study as the number of years the individual had been CEO of a given company.
Liquidity. Firms experiencing cash shortages may prefer to grant options rather than use cash compensation (Shin 2005) ; therefore, we control for liquidity using current assets scaled by current liabilities.
Financial Leverage. We measure financial leverage as firm indebtedness, which may limit the extent of risk taking and use of incentive plans (Yermack 1995) . We scaled the firm's debt by the company's assets.
CEO Salary Exceeding $1 Million. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 provides a limit on the deductibility of non-performance-based executive compensation in excess of $1 million (Tolia 1997) . Although companies may choose to pay higher taxes and pay higher salaries, we control for instances when the salary exceeds this limit. The indicator variable is equal to 1 if the CEO salary exceeds $1 million and 0 otherwise.
Firm Risk.
If compensation is commensurate with the company's risk, executives in high-risk environments may receive higher compensation (David et al. 1998, Hill and Phan 1991) . Accordingly, we control for a firm's systematic risk, as measured by the variance of firm stock price relative to that of the stock market.
Lagged Compensation. Prior compensation may affect current executive compensation, so we introduced lagged compensation variables in the models. To the extent that prior compensation determines subsequent compensation, this variable also implicitly controls for omitted variables (Daily et al. 1998 ).
Institutional Ownership. Prior research indicates that aggregate institutional ownership affects compensation (e.g., Khan et al. 2005) . We control for total ownership of other institutional investors.
Industry. Previous studies link industry affiliation and CEO compensation (Gomez-Mejia 1994 , Lambert et al. 1991 . We control for industry by using dummy codes that represent the SIC two-digit classification of the firm.
Analyses
It is more appropriate to study the relationship between ownership and compensation in a longitudinal manner, because cross-sectional specification can lead to biased or misleading parameter estimates (Murphy 1985, Finkelstein and Boyd 1998) . Therefore, we used crosssectional time-series analyses, which can isolate the effects of specific actions and treatments over time and cross sections. Furthermore, with panel data analysis, which uses the stratification of individual entities and grouping around time to provide better control on the effects of missing or unobserved variables (Hsiao 1986 ), we can analyze both the idiosyncratic and intertemporal dynamics of the entities (Hill and Phan 1991) . Our a priori choice for the analysis was a random-effects model (REM) because we intend to make inferences beyond the sample used in this study, and REM allows us to model the error specific to cross-sectional and temporal units (Maddala 2002) . This model employs generalized least squares (GLS) and thereby preserves more of the information in the data and tends to be more efficient. Furthermore, unlike fixed-effects models (FEM), REMs let us include time-invariant variables such as industry controls.
5 Finally, we applied models that accommodated both cross-sectional and temporal random effects to control for changing economic conditions over the 10-year period that our data encompass.
Results
The descriptive statistics, including means, standard deviations, and correlations, for all study variables are provided in Table 2 . The majority of the correlations are significant at the 0.001 level and are of magnitude and direction similar to those found in previous studies (e.g., David et al. 1998 ). In the years represented by the panel, on average total CEO compensation is $4.35 million (standard deviation [s.d.] $5.36 million), salary proportion constitutes 31.2%, contingent compensation proportion is 53.7%, and overall pay for performance sensitivity is 1.13. The average CEO ownership is 2% (s.d. of 5.6%), in line with previous studies (McGuire and Matta 2003) , and average ownership by the largest institutional owner is 8.6%, (s.d. of 4.9%). The portfolio concentration measure reveals that the average investment in the largest institutional owner's portfolio has a market value of $85.4 million (s.d. of $101.1 million) and that 24.9% (s.d. of 21.7%) of the investor's portfolio is held in blocks of 5% or greater. The portfolio turnover statistics suggest that institutional investors on average change ownership in 12.5% (s.d. of 6%) of their holdings from quarter to quarter. Furthermore, the average firm exceeds in value 88% (s.d. of 14%) of the portfolio holdings of its largest institutional owner. In addition to these descriptive statistics, the correlation table provides some interesting insights. In line with previous research, we find that firm size, growth, profitability, and CEO duality correlate positively with total compensation (r = 0 583, 0.196, 0.11, and 0.113, respectively) , and CEO ownership, typically considered a solution to agency problems, correlates negatively r = −0 169 . Finally, our firm-and portfolio-level measures correlate in an opposite manner. For example, though ownership stake by the largest institutional owner correlates negatively with total compensation r = −0 047 , portfolio concentration, portfolio blockholding, portfolio turnover, and firm significance in the portfolio correlate positively with total compensation (r = 0 382, 0.057, 0.03, 0.38), which offers some preliminary univariate support for our hypotheses.
From Table 3 , we gain some interesting insights into the implications of portfolio characteristics for governance and executive compensation. Our analyses proceeded in three steps; we note any changes in the Buse R-square. Consistent with previous studies (e.g., GomezMejia and Welbourne 1989), firm size relates positively to total compensation ( = 0 52, p < 0 001) and to the proportion of contingent compensation ( = 0 02, p < 0 01), but it relates negatively to the proportion of salary ( = −0 26, p < 0 001). Growing firms tend to provide higher levels of total compensation ( = 0 11, p < 0 001) and rely less on salary in the pay mix ( = −0 10, p < 0 001) and more on outcomesbased compensation ( = 0 03, p < 0 001), which again is consistent with previous research. Accounting profitability relates positively to total compensation ( = 0 02, p < 0 05), as does a change in CEO ( = 0 14, p < 0 001). Change in CEO also relates negatively to the proportion of salary in the pay mix ( = −0 33, p < 0 001) and positively to the proportion of contingent compensation ( = 0 07, p < 0 001). CEO ownership relates negatively to the proportion of contingent compensation ( = −0 01, p < 0 05). Increased ownership causes the CEO to bear more risk, which can be exacerbated by increased incentive pay and therefore lead to greater risk aversion (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia 1998) . Finally, financial leverage is associated with reduced total compensation ( = −0 09, p < 0 001), an increased proportion of salary ( = 0 08, p < 0 001), and the proportion of contingent compensation ( = −0 01, p < 0 01). Consistent with prior research (e.g., Hartzell and Starks 2003) firm size relates negatively to pay for performance sensitivity ( = −0 33, p < 0 001). Perhaps because powerful CEOs can extract higher compensation regardless of firm performance, CEO duality negatively related to pay for performance sensitivity ( = −0 29, p < 0 001), whereas the link is positive for new CEOs ( = 0 72, p < 0 001).
In Hypothesis 1, we suggested that greater ownership by the top institutional owner would increase its ability to influence the firm and thus facilitate monitoring and is associated with less total compensation, greater pay for performance sensitivity, a higher proportion of salary, and a lower proportion of contingent compensation (see Core et al. 1999 , David et al. 1998 , Hartzell and Starks 2003 , Mehran 1995 . Consistent with previous findings, large institutional owners, by the very nature of their ownership stakes and monitoring abilities in comparison with small owners, have the ability to influence CEO compensation. Our results also indicate that the largest owners are able to monitor; the coefficient for largest institutional owner is negative for total compensation ( = −0 03, p < 0 05) but is not significantly related to pay for performance sensitivity. Additional analyses indicate that large institutional ownership is associated with pay for performance sensitivity in the absence of portfolio considerations (see Appendix 1). In addition, large institutional owners are positively associated with salary as a proportion of total compensation ( = 0 03, p < 0 05) even after we control for most of the standard variables in such research. In addition, by using panel data analysis techniques, we intentionally controlled for the effects of missing and unobserved variables and isolated effects both cross-sectionally and over time. Any limitations in the choice of variables or endogeneity are not specific to our sample, and we replicate previous results for this particular hypothesis.
In strong support of Hypothesis 2, we find that the owner's portfolio concentration is negatively associated with monitoring effectiveness. Specifically, portfolio concentration in terms of increases in average holdings relates positively to the level of total compensation ( = 0 03 p < 0 05), negatively to pay for performance sensitivity ( = −0 23, p < 0 05), and negatively to salary as a percentage of total compensation ( = −0 02, p < 0 05). Similarly, greater portfolio blockholding (i.e., the number of blocks in the portfolio) by the largest institutional owner compromises its firmlevel monitoring. Portfolio blockholding is associated with greater total compensation ( = 0 03, p < 0 05) and a higher proportion of contingent compensation ( = 0 01, p < 0 001). The portfolio-level effects for the largest institutional owner are in the opposite direction of the firm-level ownership effect.
In weak support of Hypothesis 3, portfolio turnover is associated with less reliance on salary as a proportion of pay ( = −0 02, p < 0 05), which suggests that the turnover in the largest owner's portfolio relates to complacency in monitoring. Finally, contrary to Hypothesis 4, we find that firm significance in the portfolio relates positively to the level of total compensation ( = 0 06, p < 0 001), negatively to pay for performance sensitivity ( = −0 07, p < 0 05), negatively to the proportion of salary ( = −0 06, p < 0 001), and positively to the proportion of contingent compensation ( = 0 02, p < 0 001). Overall, our results indicate that portfoliolevel influences are significantly associated with facets of compensation, and researchers and practitioners need Step 1 Notes. N = 4 520 (533 firms × 10 years). * p < 0 05, * * p < 0 01, * * * p < 0 001. a 49 dummy codes controlling for SIC two-digit industry level are not reported here for brevity.
to consider these effects to obtain a clearer picture of monitoring by institutional investors.
Finally, to test our exploratory-interaction hypothesis, we used the standard Aiken and West (1991) methodology to create the interaction terms and found that the variance inflation factors for the variables in the model were all within an acceptable range <10 . We discuss only interactions when the change in R-square over the previous model is significant. We find that ownership interacts with firm significance in the portfolio to increase total compensation ( = 0 03, p < 0 001) and pay for performance sensitivity ( = 0 11, p < 0 001) while reducing the proportion of salary ( = −0 02, p < 0 05). In addition, firm-level ownership interacts with portfolio turnover to influence pay for performance sensitivity ( = 0 06, p < 0 05) and the proportion of salary ( = 0 03, p < 0 01). Finally, firm-level ownership interacts with portfolio blockholdings to influence pay for performance sensitivity ( = −0 05, p < 0 05). Given the limited theory development and empirical research regarding portfolio significance, we discuss some possible explanations subsequently. Although most effects were in the hypothesized direction, the results for firm significance indicate the need for future research.
To understand this further, we plotted the interaction of the largest institutional owner and firm significance with respect to total compensation in Figure 1 ( = 0 03, p < 0 001), which reveals that, on one hand, greater significance is associated with higher levels of total compensation, irrespective of ownership. On the other hand, monitoring by the larger institutional owner suppresses total compensation in low-significance firms in the portfolio. We discuss this point more subsequently.
Supplementary Analyses
Although our results indicate that the presence of powerful institutional owners constrains the ability of agents to extract excessive compensation, we do not find a significant effect on pay for performance sensitivity. Because Hartzell and Starks (2003) found that ownership by the top five institutional investors relates positively, we conducted additional analyses using their model specification as a starting point, but we replaced their ownership construct "ownership by the top five institutional investors" with our "ownership of the largest institutional owner" (see Appendix 1). Similar to their results, we find that market capitalization relates negatively to options performance sensitivity ( = −0 17, p < 0 001), whereas ownership by the largest institutional owner relates positively to it ( = 0 04, p < 0 05). However, when we extend the model by including our portfoliolevel explanatory variables, the coefficient for the largest institutional owner no longer is significant. In addition, consistent with the prior model specification, portfolio concentration and firm significance in the portfolio relate negatively to pay for performance sensitivity ( = −0 09, p < 0 001; = −0 16, p < 0 001, respectively).
Although we direct attention to the underresearched area of how the portfolio characteristics of institutional investors affect their incentives to monitor, institutional investors can develop the organizational capabilities to handle the complexity of monitoring. For example, competent institutional investors may make more investments and still manage them effectively or recruit more fund managers to deal with the resulting complexity. Thus, an institutional owner's organizational capability in managing diversified investments merits consideration in the context of monitoring at the firm level. We therefore obtained data on mutual fund performance and the number of funds per institutional investor from the CRSP Mutual Fund database, a comprehensive data set that provides information about open-end mutual funds. The CRSP database identifies fund managers by name or simply as "team managed"; therefore, the number of funds per institutional investor is a proxy for the number of managers employed by the fund and thus the expertise availability for the investor. We measured prior performance of each fund as the increase (decrease) in net assets value per share (NAV). Because different funds manage different amounts of assets, we scaled the measure by the total net assets (TNA) managed by each fund and then aggregated them to reach a performance measure for the institutional investor. Unfortunately, such data are not available for all institutional owners, which significantly reduces our data set n = 2 428 . Because of the large number of observations missing from our panel, we conduct an ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis of the pooled data (see Appendix 2). In the presence of autocorrelation, OLS is consistent but inefficient, so we use the Newey-West correction (Greene 2003) . Despite the added controls and sample size differences, the tenets of our inferences remain unchanged. Similar to the results we discussed previously, the coefficient for the largest institutional owner is negative for total compensation ( = −0 10, p < 0 001), positive for salary as a proportion of total compensation ( = 0 08, p < 0 001), and negative for the proportion of contingent compensation ( = −0 02, p < 0 01). We find that the owner's portfolio concentration relates positively to the level of total compensation ( = 0 13 p < 0 001), negatively to pay for performance sensitivity ( = −0 34, p < 0 001) and to salary as a percentage of total compensation ( = −0 06, p < 0 01), and positively to the proportion of contingent pay ( = 0 01, p < 0 05). Again, in contrast with Hypothesis 4, we find that firm significance in the owner's portfolio relates positively to the level of total compensation ( = 0 22, p < 0 001), negatively to pay for performance sensitivity ( = −0 24, p < 0 001), negatively to the proportion of salary ( = −0 11, p < 0 001), and positively to the proportion of contingent compensation ( = 0 02, p < 0 001). Although the effect of portfolio blockholding on pay for performance sensitivity is insignificant in the full sample, when we controlled for fund performance and the number of funds per institutional investor, we found that portfolio blockholding is related positively to pay for performance sensitivity ( = 0 17, p < 0 01). Consistent with our reasoning that competent institutional investors tend to make more investments and manage them more effectively, the number of fund managers relates positively to pay for performance sensitivity ( = 0 07, p < 0 05). Prior fund performance is not significantly related to executive compensation, irrespective of the measure of compensation used. Because fund performance is a conjoint indicator of the institutional investor's ability to both select investments and exercise monitoring, the use of a finer-grained measure of organizational capability seems well warranted.
Finally, we must consider the issue of endogeneity, especially because increased institutional ownership is accompanied by the increased use of stock option compensation during our study period. These trends could cause spurious relationships between the two variables (Hartzell and Starks 2003) . To address this issue, we conducted two-stage least squares (2SLS) (see Appendix 3). In the first stage, we estimated institutional ownership using prior changes in shareholder wealth, firm size, industry, year, and turnover (Bennett et al. 2003) as instrumental variables. In the second stage, we estimated pay for performance sensitivity using the fitted values from the first-stage regression and introducing portfolio-level variables in the model. Similar to previously reported results, portfolio concentration and firm significance are adversely related to pay for performance sensitivity ( = −0 002, p < 0 001; = −2 61 p < 0 001). The coefficients for these variables do not change significantly if we control for institutional investor performance or the number of funds managed ( = −0 002, p < 0 001; = −2 74 p < 0 001), though the coefficient for portfolio blockholding is significant in the extended model ( = 0 70, p < 0 05).
Discussion and Conclusion
We have argued that, to comprehend the implications of large institutional owners in terms of monitoring effectiveness, researchers must focus not only on firm-level ownership in a focal firm but also on the portfolio-level characteristics of its largest institutional investor. Consistent with previous literature, we use various controls (e.g., industry, size, growth, profitability, CEO ownership, change in CEO, CEO duality, leverage, liquidity, risk, etc.) and find that they behave as anticipated. We therefore test a traditional hypothesis relating large institutional ownership to aspects of CEO compensation (level, sensitivity, and mix) and then supplement it with hypotheses pertaining to the implications of four portfolio characteristics of large owners, namely, average holdings, blockholdings, turnover, and significance of the focal firm. Our findings clearly indicate that portfolio characteristics matter. Larger average holdings, more blockholdings, portfolio turnover, and even the portfolio significance of firms potentially offset the monitoring benefits of large institutional owners.
As we noted previously, large owners appear to offer an important solution to the agency problems in the face of dispersed ownership. Large institutional owners at the firm level are associated with reduced levels of total compensation, increased pay for performance sensitivity, and influence on the pay mix. Do these large institutional owners' portfolios hinder overall monitoring effectiveness? In other words, if large institutional owners (e.g., Fidelity with approximately 3,000 firms in its portfolio) have numerous stakes in many firms, are firm-level monitoring benefits offset by portfolio-level characteristics?
To answer this question, we assess the impact of the portfolio and conclude that it offsets overall monitoring effectiveness at the firm level. All else being equal, larger average holdings, more blockholdings, more turnover, and even firm significance in the portfolio reduced monitoring effectiveness. In our supplementary analyses, we include two additional measures of the institutional investors' capacity to monitor (number of funds as a proxy for the number of fund managers and overall portfolio profitability as a measure of capability) and still find support for our portfolio variables. Second, we replicate findings from Hartzell and Starks (2003) for large owners' positive effects on pay for performance sensitivity and demonstrate that our portfolio variables counteract the firm-level effect. This indicates the utility of the portfolio variables even when using different techniques and with different control variables. Third, in response to Demsetz's (1983) admonition about firm ownership's endogeneity implications and the well documented need among institutional owners for liquidity (Bennett et al. 2003) , we use firm share turnover as an instrumental variable for total institutional ownership and show that portfolio effects still matter. Overall, our results suggest that the beneficial effect of monitoring by large institutional owners gets constrained by their portfolio characteristics.
From a theoretical perspective, institutional owners' portfolio characteristics and investor orientation limit the development of sufficient monitoring capacity as demanded by their highly fragmented portfolios. We have suggested various reasons (e.g., multiple fund objectives, costs, incentives, etc.) for this state of affairs. Institutional investors may focus on risk and cost reduction, as well as on reducing the "annoyance of monitoring management" (Demsetz 1983 ). The average value of the equity stake held by the largest institutional investor in our sample was $86 million. With many such investments, owners may become overburdened and fractured and therefore resort to focusing their limited monitoring capacity on either a few very large holdings or highly visible problematic holdings. At the bottom line, the suppression effect generated at the firm level may be offset by demands at the portfolio level, as indicated by our empirical findings. Higher average holdings demand more monitoring and are associated with higher total compensation, lower salary proportion, higher contingent proportion in the pay mix, and lower pay for performance sensitivity. If larger institutional investors actually have greater monitoring capacity, and if having larger average portfolio holdings is a proxy for that capacity, we should have found opposite portfolio effects.
Furthermore, our findings about other portfolio characteristics are similar and, more important, consistent with our preceding theorizing. When the number of blockholdings in the institutional owner's portfolio is greater, the owner's monitoring effectiveness is compromised. Portfolio blockholding relates positively to the level of total compensation and pay mix that favors contingent pay. In other words, the number of blockholdings appears to compromise the benefit of firm-level blockholding. We thus repeat our preceding arguments: With more blockholdings, institutional investors gain more experience and economies of scale and scope with respect to monitoring. However, everything else being constant, maintaining a large number of blocks offsets the benefits of firm-level effects by straining the institutional investors' monitoring capacity.
Our findings pertaining to portfolio turnover are somewhat weaker, in that it relates negatively to only the percentage of salary in the pay mix. We hypothesized that, as institutional owners become more short-termoriented and increase their use of exit as an alternative, they compromise their monitoring. Two possible explanations may explain our contrary finding. First, portfolio turnover decreased over the time period of our study as more institutional owners began to offer "indexed funds" to investors (Pozen 2002) . As fund managers began to choose broad indices, such as the S&P 500 or the Russell 3,000, they de facto became passive investors whose active trading volume was limited to adjustments in the index, which decreased turnover. Although we do not have access to information about the volume of indexing activity, anecdotal evidence suggests that it is on the rise (Pozen 2002) and may be associated with reduced variance in turnover. Second, researchers should consider owner turnover at the firm level, because as institutional investors increase their stakes in the firm they may increase their monitoring. In contrast, if they decrease their stake, it may signal reduced monitoring and an increased desire to exit.
Finally, the portfolio significance of the target firm relates positively to the level of total compensation but negatively to pay for performance sensitivity and proportion of salary of total compensation. This interesting finding contrasts with our hypothesized effect, which favored monitoring-based explanations for executive compensation. Conventional theorizing might suggest that large owners are more likely to monitor the larger firms in their portfolios because of the obvious benefits associated with such monitoring (Ryan and Schneider 2002 ), but our finding necessitates an examination of alternative explanations. One such explanation relies on the power imbalance between the interested parties. As David and colleagues (1998) argue, CEO compensation could be an outcome of a political process, and large owners may be able to exercise more power in furthering their interests. Although prior research does not differentiate explicitly among monitoring, power, and deterrence by large owners, our portfolio significance findings may shed new light on this area of CEO compensation. That is, we find that large owners are less able to influence larger firms in their portfolios. Instead, they are better able to monitor smaller firms in which they have large ownership positions. However, as the firms get larger, the owners' monitoring effectiveness appears to be negated (perhaps due to their lesser power compared with huge firms like General Electric or ExxonMobil). Perhaps large investors tread carefully in such cases, because the downside risks of fallout from ineffective monitoring may be greater for larger holdings. Alternatively, institutions may get locked into the companies in which they have invested the most (Short and Keasey 1997) , which makes changes in compensation and/or governance more difficult.
From our investigation of interaction effects (Figure 1) , we find that large owners make no difference for significant firms in their portfolio with respect to total compensation. Consistent with our findings pertaining to Hypothesis 4, for firms that are more important in the portfolio, the suppression effect of firm concentration vanished. It exists for firms with low significance where owners have higher stakes and the firm is not highly significant in the portfolio. Although our portfolio concentration and turnover effects are in the appropriate direction, our findings regarding firm significance in the portfolio raise interesting questions that need further investigation and have important practical significance. In general, portfolio effects are in the opposite direction of the firm-level influences, so both firm and portfolio effects matter. Paying singular attention to either one will result in an incomplete understanding of the phenomenon of monitoring effectiveness.
In addition to our empirical findings, our study has practical implications. First, there is a possibility of creating market intermediaries who could offer monitoring services more economically (Coffee 1991 , Latham 1998 . Because these services would be targeted at institutional owners, investors would have to incur greater monitoring fees to acquire them, which means greater costs to individual investors interested in encouraging greater monitoring or incentivizing fund managers to monitor. Second, in perhaps a more obvious solution, portfolio diversification and monitoring capacity should be considered in conjunction. Basic finance textbooks indicate that 99% of market risk can be eliminated by using a portfolio of 100 stocks (Brealey and Meyers 2003) . If so, more work needs to be done to clarify the diversification-monitoring tradeoff, especially as portfolios become larger. Third, because portfolio diversification may weaken governance with respect to compensation, it may encourage other alternate governance mechanisms such as the market for corporate control (Bhide 1994, Rediker and Seth 1995) . Researchers and practitioners need to be aware of both the benefits and costs of large institutional owners' portfolio diversification in the context of corporate governance.
We believe that our findings have strong moorings, in that our sample consists of many large firms over a long time period, and the firms in our sample have fairly high levels of institutional ownership, a necessary condition for testing our hypotheses. However, our study has several limitations. For the sake of parsimony we focused only on the largest institutional owner's portfolio. Researchers indicate that, because of the free-rider problem, only a large shareholder has the incentive to engage in costly monitoring (Gillan and Starks 2000) . Consideration of several of the larger owners might provide more insight, though it would also have to take into consideration that different owners could have conflicting interests (Hoskisson et al. 2002) . In addition, the nature of the available data limited our focus on large firms, so it would be interesting to determine whether the findings generalize to smaller firms. Finally, we focused on executive compensation. Additional studies should consider other issues such as valuation, productivity, research and development, and so forth.
To extend previous research (e.g., David et al. 1998 , Graves 1988 , Hartzell and Starks 2003 , we investigate institutional ownership and portfolio characteristics at the aggregate institutional level. Although focusing on institutional ownership at the broadest level makes sense in most cases, mutual funds and investment companies constitute the largest subset of owners within this broad category of ownership (Roe 1994) , and the ownership stakes of such institutions (e.g., Vanguard, Fidelity) may not easily aggregate into a single category. For example, institutional owners may manage various mutual funds with different investment objectives and different fund advisers and managers dedicated to meeting their various clients' objectives. Therefore, the monitoring needs of growth fund portfolios might not coincide with the needs of income fund portfolios that belong to the same mutual fund family of a particular institutional investor.
Given these limitations, further research could proceed in two broad directions. First, a finer structural measurement of the institutional owners' portfolios is warranted. For example, by considering Fidelity, a large institutional owner, we achieved simplicity in understanding its effect, even though Fidelity represents the additive sum of different fund managers and advisers. By addressing differences within large owners (i.e., at the fund level), researchers may get a more accurate picture of this phenomenon. Second, further research should explore some other antecedents that could shed light on why large institutional investors monitor particular firms in their portfolios, choose to be active with respect to certain shareholdings, or neglect certain firms altogether. Although we know much about monitoring and shareholder activism, we have limited knowledge about why large institutional investors choose to be active monitors in some firms and not others.
Finally, though this study cannot provide conclusive evidence about the importance of the portfolio characteristics of institutional owners, it offers a means by which to understand the possible negation of the ownership influences at the firm level. Overall, we provide preliminary evidence that the portfolio characteristics of the largest institutional owner tend to contradict the firm-level effects; therefore, we firmly recommend that future studies consider both firm-and portfolio-level effects simultaneously to explain executive compensation and other organizational issues influenced by corporate governance. Step 2 Portfolio concentration −0 092 * * * Portfolio blockholding 0 026 Portfolio turnover 0 021 Firm significance −0 163 * * * in portfolio Number of 3,744 observations R-square (%) 7 3 9 8 Change in R-square 2 5 * * * Notes. a 49 dummy codes controlling for SIC two-digit industry level and eight dummy codes controlling for year effects are not reported here for brevity. The sample is reduced by one year due to the use of double-lagged independent variable (i.e., change in shareholder wealth t−1 ).
* p < 0 05, * * p < 0 01, * * * p < 0 001. Model 7
Model 8
Model 9
Model 13
Model 14
Model 15
Step 1 Step 2 a 49 dummy codes controlling for SIC two-digit industry level and eight dummy codes controlling for year effects are not reported here for brevity. The sample is reduced by one year due to the inclusion of a double-lagged independent variable (change in shareholder wealth t−1 ). * p < 0 05, * * p < 0 01, * * * p < 0 001.
Endnotes
1 Consider the following recent examples: 776 corporate governance proposals submitted by shareholders during the 2004 proxy season, 40% were related to executive compensation (Georgeson Shareholder Report 2004) . Institutional investors seek to shape compensation through proxy voting and by formulating voting guidelines; for example, the institutional owner CalPERS (California Personnel Employee Retirement System) not only voted against 43% of executive stock plans in 1999-2000 but also withheld votes from members of compensation committees who had authorized "outrageous" compensation for CEOs and other top executives (Frederic W. Cook and Co. 2001) . 2 As an anonymous reviewer pointed out, this issue is more complicated because of risk considerations. As research by Zajac and colleagues (Beatty and suggests, monitoring relates inversely to incentives, but risky firms (e.g., initial public offering firms) must rely more on monitoring than on incentives. 3 Although some data on CEO compensation are available through ExecuComp from 1992, the majority of the data points are missing for that year. 4 Where P = market price of the stock on the date the option was granted; E = exercise price of the option grant; d = ln 1+ dividend per share ; r = ln 1 + interest rate , where interest rate is the interest on 10-year U.S. treasury bonds during the last month of the year; and T = life of options, equal to the time period until the expiration date of the option grant. When the expiration date is not reported, we set the option's life equal to 10 years, the period used by an overwhelming majority of the awards (Yermack 1995) ; and = standard BlackScholes volatility calculated over 60 months. 5 Our conclusions are essentially the same if we use FEM; the results are available from the authors on request. 6 We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for this insight.
